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BLAINE SLOAN LECTUREt
SOLIDARITY IN THE PRACTICE AND
DISCOURSE OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW
R. St. J. Macdonaldtt
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that "solidarity" is
both a fundamental and a fundamentally sound principle of in-
ternational law. I will argue that, as a principle of interna-
tional law, solidarity has existed within the discourse for a
significant period; that it can be found in the work of qualified
publicists; that it is evidenced in multilateral and bilateral trea-
ties; and that it is a principle gaining both recognition and im-
portance in the structure of the contemporary international
legal order.
Solidarity is first and foremost a principle of cooperation
which identifies as the goal of joint and separate state action an
outcome that benefits all states or at least does not gravely in-
t This lecture was given at Pace University School of Law on 15 February
1996 for the Tenth Annual Blaine Sloan Lecture in Public International Law. The
Blaine Sloan Lecture is presented by the Pace International Law Society and the
Pace International Law Reivew to honor Blaine Sloan, Professor Emeritus of Inter-
national Law and Organization at Pace University School of Law. The purpose of
the lecture is to continue the spirit of scholarly debate for which Professor Sloan is
noted for. He has had a distinguished career in the field of international law; serv-
ing as Director of the General Legal Division of the United Nations Office of Legal
Affairs from 1966-78, and as Deputy to the Under Secretary-General, Legal Af-
fairs, 1978, and as the founder of the Pace International Law Curriculum.
tt Judge at the European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg; Professor of
International Law, University of Toronto; Membre de l'Institut, Geneva. I am
grateful to Dean Ottinger, the Faculty of Law, the Pace International Law Society
and the Pace International Law Review for inviting me to present this paper as the
Blaine Sloan Lecture at the Pace University School of Law (February 15, 1996). It
is a pleasure as well as an honor to speak in praise of Blaine B. Sloan, a distin-
guished jurist and great-hearted gentleman. I am grateful also to Andreas
Bardong for his research, assistance and guidance with the German-language
materials.
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terfere with the interests of other states. Solidarity, as a princi-
ple of international law, creates a context for meaningful
cooperation that goes beyond the concept of a global welfare
state; on the legal plane it reflects and reinforces the broader
idea of a world community of interdependent states.
Several writers have already identified trends in the behav-
ior of states that reflect ideas of solidarity. For example, Presi-
dent Bedjaoui of the International Court of Justice has said that
"by asserting the common good.., the majority of States have
set in train a process in which the emphasis is placed on
whatever may be expected to contribute to reducing the de facto
inequalities between States and to promote greater heed for the
long-term interests of the globe."1 It is this process - the for-
mulation of and adherence to measures that enhance the com-
mon good - that impels my interest and constitutes the focus of
this paper.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Solidarity as a principle of international law was first pos-
ited by Emer de Vattel in the mid-eighteenth century.2 Work-
ing from ideas of Christian Wolff, Vattel argued that states
have a duty to mutual assistance in order to improve their gen-
eral situation and relations.3 "La premiere loi g~n6rale que le
but mime de la Socidt6 des Nations nous ddcouvrons est que
chaque Nation doit contribuer au bonheur et A la perfection des
autres tout ce qui est en son pouvoir."4
Vattel considered solidarity to be the basic condition for the
existence of a community of states-a compulsory natural law
that could not be altered, abolished or negotiated. His concep-
tion of solidarity thus resembles a jus cogens norm, that is, a
1 Mohammed Bedjaoui, General Introduction, INTERNATIONAL LAw: ACHIEVE-
MENTS AND PROSPECTS 1, 14 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991).
2 Emer de Vattel, LE DROIT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA SOUVERAINET9,
(1758, reprint Geneva, 1958) Pr6liminaires ss. 1-16; Livre II, Chapitre I, ss. 11-20.
On the whole subject see the outstanding study by RAIMUND SCHITZ, SOLIDARIAT
IM WIRTSCHAFTSVOLKERRECHT, EINE BESTANDSAUFNAHME ZENTRALER ENTWICK-
LUNGSSPEZIFISCHER SOLIDARRECHTE UND SOLIDARPFLICHTEN IM VOLKERRECHT, 26
(1994).
3 CHRISTIAN WOLFF, Jus GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM
§§ 12, 156-172 (Joseph H. Drake trans., 1934) (1764).
4 Vattel, supra note 2, Pr4liminaires ss. 13.
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norm "not at the disposal of contracting parties owing to [its]
essential role in the preservation of the international commu-
nity."5 Although Vattel conceived of solidarity as functioning at
the most essential level of international law, he considered the
obligations it creates moral rather than legal, and therefore, dif-
ficult to enforce. 6
Vattel's eighteenth-century perplexity over how to resolve
the principle of solidarity as something essential, yet volun-
tary-basic to the law of nations, yet unenforceable-has not
appreciably diminished in the past two centuries. Indeed,
whatever impetus there was to reconcile the tension between
the interests of the individual state and the interests of the
global community was dampened significantly during the impe-
rial era of the nineteenth century. It was then that the theory
and practice of sovereignty acquired heightened prominence in
the international community. Sovereignty superseded solidar-
ity to such an extent that, in the waning decades of the nine-
teenth century, solidarity was used as a justification for colonial
domination. The responsibility of states to one another became
the "civilizing mission" of European states in their quest for co-
lonial control over the populations of other states.
The first half of the twentieth century was similarly unfa-
vorable for the principle of global solidarity. During the brief
existence of the League of Nations, an isolated example of soli-
darity made its way into Article 22 of the Covenant, under
which a "sacred trust" constituted the basis for the mandate
system; but the principle of mutual responsibility was relevant
mainly to the extent that it could be identified in treaties con-
cluded between particular states; no general principle of legal
responsibility to the community as a whole was articulated at
the official level. During the global depression of the 1930s, the
League was preoccupied with the struggle to maintain peace
and security, and efforts to realize an attitude of solidarity sim-
ply failed. By the end of World War II, however, members of the
5 Jochen Abr. Frowein, Jus Cogens, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 327 (R. Bernhardt ed., 1984).
6 On this topic see Heinhard Steiger, SolidaritU und Souverdinitdt oder Vat-
tel Reconsidered, in AuF EINEM DRITrEN WEG, FESTSCHRIFT FUR HELMUT RIDDER
ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG, 97 (Stein-Faber ed., 1989).
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global community had become more ready to establish a legal
foundation for global cooperation and mutual responsibility.7
II. OPImIONS AND PRACTICE ON SOLIDARITY
Since 1945, legal scholars gradually have come to agree
that the principle of solidarity exists at the level of interna-
tional law. They disagree, however, about the nature of the
principle. One school argues that the principle of solidarity cre-
ates no extra-legal obligations, which it holds arise only from
treaties and other legally binding international agreements. A
second school argues that the principle of solidarity implies an
extra-legal obligation on the part of developed states to assist
less developed countries (LDCs)-or, at a minimum, not to in-
terfere with the interests of other states by pursuing entirely
self-interested economic policies. A third school believes that
solidarity is less an isolated statement within international law
than a principle beginning to inform the entire system. It is
similar to the concept of equity in domestic law, except that
"fairness" is a subset of solidarity, rather than the whole of the
principle. Adherents to this school hold that solidarity repre-
sents a direction in which international law is traveling.8
At the level of practice, a significant number of major legal
texts have been created, in part to extend a principle of solidar-
ity to world economic behavior. Similarly, there have been im-
portant instruments outlining the principle of environmental
solidarity have been created at regional and universal levels.
These provisions on states' obligations to protect the economic
and environmental interests of other states are fully consistent
with the UN Charter, which requires states to cooperate in sup-
7 DOROTHY V. JONES, CODE OF PEACE: ETHICS AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD
OF THE WARLORD STATES (1991).
8 GEORG DAHM, ET AL., I/ VOLKERRECHT, 222 (2d ed. 1988); Alexandre-
Charles Kiss, Les resources naturelles et le droit international; Conclusions, 45-56
ANNUAIRE DE L'A.A.A. 263, 271 (1984-86); MILAN BuL~nc, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW, 236 (1986); Paul de Waart, The Right to Development:
Utopian or Real?, in RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE
ROLE OF LAW AND LAWYERS, 99 (Pieter van Djk et al. eds., 1987); PIETER
VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAw, 194 (1981); Ulrich Scheuner, Solidaritat unter den Nationen als Grundsatz in
der gegenwartigen internationalen Gemeinschaft, in RECHT IM DIENSTE DES
FRIEDENS, FEsTscHRiFr FOR EBERHARD MENZEL (Jost Delbruck et al. eds., 1975);
Mbaye, Art. 2, 1, in Cot/Pellet, La Charte des Nations Unies, 87 (1985).
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porting the goals it itemized on peace, prosperity and human
rights. The existing term for these obligations, erga omnes,
finds its best-known articulation in the Barcelona Traction
case9 decision, which International Court of Justice draws a dis-
tinction between the obligations of a state toward the interna-
tional community as a whole and those vis-A-vis another state-
for example, obligations in the field of diplomatic protection.
"By their very nature," said the Court, "the former are the con-
cern of all states. In view of the importance of the rights in-
volved, all states can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes."10 In the remarks
that follow, I will briefly review a few of the pertinent obliga-
tions in the domain of economic and environmental law in the
context of a "larger reading" of obligations erga omnes, that is to
say, solidarity.
III. SOLIDARITY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
1. Declaration Concerning the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order
The principles of cooperation expressed in the UN Charter,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Declara-
tion of Friendly Relations were more specifically defined at the
sixth special session of the General Assembly in 1974, which
was dedicated entirely to the New International Economic Or-
der (NIEO). The record of its oral debates evidences a will to
establish a new cooperative system of economic relations in-
formed by the principle of solidarity.'1
The preamble to the Declaration of 1 May 1974 Concerning
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order
(NIEO)12 identifies the principles of equity, the interdependence
of all peoples, and cooperation among states as the bases of the
NIEO. For the first time, the General Assembly calls for elimi-
9 Barcelona Traction case (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3.
10 Id. See further R. St. J. Macdonald, Fundamental Norms in Contemporary
International Law, 25 THE CANADiA Y.B. INT'L L. 115 (1987).
11 Mohammed Bedjaoui, Droit du Dgveloppement et jus cogens 54-56 AN-
NUAIRE DE L'A.A.A. 275 (1984-86).
12 Declaration of 1 May 1974 Concerning the Establishment of a New Interna-
tional Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1,
U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
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nation of inequality and correction of injustices. The purpose of
cooperation is declared to be elimination of disparities among
states and preferential treatment of and active assistance to the
LDCs.
The NIEO replaced the somewhat vague procedures of the
Declaration of Friendly Relations with clearly defined princi-
ples, rights, and obligations; it required states to take active
steps to eliminate inequalities. Still, the NIEO Declaration was
just a declaration; effective implementation indeed depended on
treaties and other recognized means of establishing its princi-
ples as binding rules of international law.
2. The Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States
This Charter (December 12, 1974)13 also contains strong
statements on the duty to cooperate and actively assist the
LDCs. Although it does not create strict legal obligations, its
content is important.14 The preamble calls for establishment of
a New International Economic Order based on equity, sovereign
equality, interdependence, common interests and cooperation
among states.15 It refers to "mutual and equitable benefit" as
an essential element of the NIEO, and to "promotion of interna-
tional social justice" and "international cooperation for
development."16
A principle of solidarity underlies Article 3 of the Charter,
which stipulates that, in the exploitation of natural resources
shared by two or more countries, each state must cooperate on
the basis of a system of information and prior consultation in
order to achieve optimum use of such resources without damage
to the legitimate interests of others. 17 Article 6 underlines the
duty of states to contribute to the development of international
trade by taking into account the interests of producers and
consumers.' 8 According to that article, all states share a re-
sponsibility to promote the regular flow of and access to all com-
mercial goods traded at stable, remunerative and equitable
'3 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX),
U.N. Doc. A/3281 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.N.Y.B. 403 [hereinafter the Charter].
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
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prices, and thus to contribute to the equitable development of
the world economy, and it takes into account in particular de-
veloping counties' interests. 19
Articles 7, 8 and 9 refer to the obligations of states to pro-
mote social, economic and cultural rights, to initiate structural
changes in the international economic system, and to cooperate
in the social progress of the world.20 The strongest reference to
the principle of solidarity is found in the last sentence of Article
18: "In the conduct of international economic relations the de-
veloped countries should endeavor to avoid measures having a
negative effect on the development of the national economies of
the developing countries, as promoted by generalized tariff pref-
erences and other generally agreed differential measures in
their favor." 21 This appeal to take into consideration the exter-
nal effects of national activities is repeated and formulated as a
legal obligation in Article 24.22
What emerges from the Declaration on the NIE0 23 and the
Charter 24 is a clear sense that the obligations they describe de-
volve to the developed countries and are understood to be for
the general benefit of the LDCs. Although this preference for
the need to strengthen the position of the "have-not" states ap-
pears to make general economic sense, it does not appear to be
working well politically or in terms of actual practice. This does
not mean that the LDCs should not be given preferential treat-
ment in order to encourage their economic growth; it does sug-
gest that the principle of solidarity has been wrongly perceived
and applied in these two documents. By definition, solidarity
cannot impose a one-sided obligation, which is what they ap-
pear to do.
3. The Seoul Declaration
The Seoul Declaration of the International Law Association
(ILA)25 which, based on impressive study, attempted to estab-
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Supra note 13.
22 Id.
23 Supra note 12.
2 Supra note 13.
25 ILA, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SECOND CONFERENCE HELD AT SEOUL, AUGUST
24th to AUGUST 30th, 1986, 5.
19961
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lish the legal aspects of the NIEO, describes solidarity in a man-
ner that appears to retain the "one-way principle" of the
declarations preceding it:
The principle of solidarity reflects the growing interdependence of
economic development, the growing recognition that States have
to be made responsible for the external effects of their economic
policies and the growing awareness that underdevelopment or
wrong development of national economies is also harmful to other
nations and endangers the maintenance of peace. Without preju-
dice to more specific duties of cooperation, all States whose eco-
nomic, monetary and financial policies have a substantial impact
on other States should conduct their economic policies in a man-
ner which takes into account the interests of other countries by
appropriate procedures of consultation. In the legitimate exercise
of their economic sovereignty, they should seek to avoid any mea-
sure which causes substantial injury to other states, in particular
to the interests of developing States and their peoples.26
The preamble of the Seoul Declaration states that the principles
outlined are "generally recognized legal principles as well as
others that need acceptance by treaty or as customary interna-
tional law in order to obtain binding force." This suggests that
each principle in the document must be examined in order to
determine its legally binding character. Solidarity, then, ap-
pears to have been understood by the ILA as a principle in need
of more widespread recognition. As set out in the Seoul Decla-
ration, solidarity was still a functional rather than a material
principle containing rights and duties; it was simply an appeal
to developed countries on behalf of the LDCs.
4. The Declaration of International Economic Cooperation
Attempts to define solidarity in the previously discussed
documents were understood by all concerned as much-needed
efforts to establish the responsibility of developed countries for
the economic well-being of the LDCs. From the time of the
NIEO onwards, however, developed countries resisted any rec-
ognition, let alone imposition, of legal obligations; and by the
time of the special session of the General Assembly in 1990, a
shift had occurred in the focus of the debate about the meaning
26 Id.
[Vol. 8:259
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss2/1
SOLIDARITY
of solidarity.27 The Declaration of International Economic Co-
operation (1990),28 does not mention any of the crucial terms
used earlier, and the term "new international economic order" is
nowhere to be found. This resolution adopts a different ap-
proach to North-South relations, focusing on human rights and
protection of the environment as opposed to "unilateral" claims
of developing countries.
The Declaration has three chapters. The first deals with
the 1980s and judges that decade a loss for the developing coun-
tries: disparities between North and South increased rather
than diminished. 29 The second chapter deals with the chal-
lenges and opportunities of the 1990s, focusing particularly on
the environment.30 Paragraph 29 says that environmental
threats concern all states and must be avoided and remedied by
all, according to their means. In light of the developed nations'
wealth and technological capacities, it is apparent that most of
these responsibilities are seen as devolving on them. The third
chapter, dealing with obligations to cooperate in international
development, says that development requires the concerted ac-
tion of all states.31 Developed countries should continue to pro-
mote growth that is not detrimental to other countries, and
coordination of macroeconomic policies should take into consid-
eration the interests of all states, especially the LDCs.
Statements by some representatives at the General Assem-
bly special session echoed Judge Bedjaoui's argument for soli-
darity in economic relations on the basis of the interdependence
of the global economy. "The world has grown more interdepen-
dent,' Brazil observed, 'and, paradoxically, less co-operative.'"3 2
According to Singapore:
There are probably numerous reasons why more progress has
been achieved in international political relations than in interna-
tional economic relations. A possible reason could be that in the
27 See Russel Lawrence Barsh, Current Developments: A Special Session of
the UN General Assembly Rethinks the Economic Rights and Duties of States, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 192 (1991).
28 The Declaration of International Economic Cooperation, U.N. GAOR 18th
Spec. Sess., Supp. 2 U.N. Doc. A/S.18/15 (1990).
2 Id.
30 Id,
31 Id.
32 Supra note 27, at 193.
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global political sphere, many countries understand that they
share a commonality of interests in mutual survival, whilst inter-
national economic relations is viewed as a zero-sum game. Mar-
kets, technology, exports, foreign exchange are seen as
proprietary and exclusive, whilst political cooperation is perceived
as a necessity.33
The President of Cyprus stressed that politics and economics
are interdependent. It is a "paradox," he said, that members of
the global community can appreciate the necessity of political
cooperation without also appreciating the necessity of economic
cooperation; in his opinion, the two cannot properly be kept
distinct.34
On the whole, the declaration ... represents a balanced compro-
mise between North and South. It assigns proportionately
greater responsibility for the economic problems of the 1980s, and
meeting the 'challenges' of the 1990s, to the North. This responsi-
bility will entail increased financial and environmental self-disci-
pline, as well as transfer of resources and technology to the South.
At the same time, the South will assume the burden of
macroeconomic policy reform at the national level, including more
attention to human rights and the environment. 35
While it is difficult to weigh the influence of its conclusions
on state practice, the 1990 Special Session marked an acknowl-
edgement by states that they must share responsibility for the
general welfare of the globe. This is an important affirmation of
the concept of obligations erga omnes: the unilateral claims of
the LDCs were tempered by their recognition that they, too,
have commitments to the international community as well as to
their own economic development.
5. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947)
The GATT3 6 would appear to offer a fertile source of tangi-
ble signs of the principle of solidarity. Instead, it represents the
conflict between concepts of solidarity based on equality and
those based on preference. As is well known, three principles
33 Id.
34 Supra note 27, at 193.
3 Supra note 27, at 200.
36 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194.
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inform the General Agreement: freedom, legal equality and rec-
iprocity.37 The NIEO, on the other hand, champions new princi-
ples such as protection of the economic interests of the LDCs,
preferential treatment and nonreciprocity. 38 I will refer briefly
to the unsuccessful attempt of the GATT to accommodate the
principles of the NIEO.
The GATT accepts certain fundamental principles of liberal
trade economics. The concept of legal equality finds expression
in Article 1. 3 9 Article XI (1) prescribes the elimination of quan-
titative restrictions on international trade. 40 Article XXVIII
calls for the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of tar-
iffs. 41 The GATT essentially assumes the existence of an inter-
national society of economically, financially and technically
equal developed nations. Article XXVIII bis 1 expresses the
principle of reciprocity in decisions dealing with the accession of
new contracting parties.42 However, in a society marked by dif-
ferential development it was bound to reinforce the inequality
of states and result in the polarization of economic power in the
hands of a relatively small namber of countries. 43 In order to
overcome the inequities of the situation, several amendments
were made to the GATT's original articles, so that the result
that the document is now a hybrid of the classic principles of
international trade and the newer principles of the NIEO.
In 1955, Article XVIII was amended specifically in order to
make the treaty more attractive to developing countries. 44 The
revision conferred extended preferential rights and privileges
on those parties whose economies could support only low stan-
dards of living and were in the early stages of development.
Paragraph 4.1 allowed less developed countries "to deviate tem-
porarily" from the provisions of other articles of the Agreement,
37 Id.
38 Supra note 12.
39 Supra note 36.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 W. D. Verwey, The Principles of a New International Order and the Law of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAYT) 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 117, 122
(1990).
44 See Protocol Amending the Preamble and Parts (ii) and (iii) of the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Mar. 10, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 1767, 278 U.N.T.S. 168
(effective Oct. 7. 1957).
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and the potential of this amendment to protect infant industries
was reinforced by the adoption of the "Agreement on Interpreta-
tion and Application of Article VI, XVI and XXIII"4 5 (1979).
On the question of the elimination of nontariff barriers to
trade, the 1979 Agreement acknowledged that export subsidies
were an integral part of economic development programs in de-
veloping countries. It also said that such countries should not
be prevented from adopting policies necessary to support their
industrialization, including assistance to their exporting indus-
tries. Article XXVIII bis 3(b) stipulates that tariff negotia-
tions should provide "adequate opportunity to take into account
the needs of less-developed countries for a more flexible use of
tariff protection to assist their economic development and the
special needs of those countries to maintain tariffs for revenue
purposes."46 The farthest-reaching implementation of the fun-
damental principle of nonreciprocity is Part IV of the GATT, en-
titled "Trade and Development", 47 which entered into force in
1966.
From the 1960s through the 1980s, the economic gap be-
tween developing and developed countries widened, changes to
the GATT notwithstanding. The number of persons the World
Bank calls the "absolute poor" climbed to more than 1.3 billion,
a 50 percent increase over the number in the late 1970s. 48 In
other words, attempts to modify the GATT system to make it
more attractive to the LDCs brought about changes that were
perhaps largely cosmetic. Introducing principles of preferential
treatment and nonreciprocity into the GATT attracted more sig-
natories among the LDCs but did not appreciably diminish the
effects of liberal trade on nonpowerful members. The failure of
the modified GATT to enact the principles of solidarity, despite
its seeming to ascribe to them, suggests that the concept of soli-
darity as "preference" needed to be rethought.
45 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, 1186
U.N.T.S. 204, reprinted in 18 ILM 579 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1980) [hereinafter
the 1979 Agreement].
46 Id.
47 Protocol Amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to Intro-
duce a Part IV on Trade and Development, Feb. 8, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1977, 572
U.N.T.S. 320.
48 SISSELA BOK, COMMON VALUS 2-4 (1995).
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6. The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Connected
Agreements (GATT 1994, GATS, and so forth)
At the Summit Conference for the Middle East and North
Africa in Casablanca, Morocco (October 31, 1994), six and one
half months after the Final Act of the Uruguay Round was
signed in Marrakesh,49 Peter Sutherland, Director-General of
the GATT, said: "In addition to consolidating and extending the
frontier of trade liberalization, the WTO will also provide a plat-
form for developing a new global trade agenda; for improving
international economic cooperation and for promoting sustaina-
ble development in developing countries."50 Whether future ef-
forts to benefit the developing countries within the WTO
framework will be fruitful remains to be seen. While changes in
the GATT rules, the new rules on the liberalization of services,
and the structure of the WTO organization do not improve the
situation of the developing countries dramatically, their inter-
ests have not been totally neglected. I will now review a few of
these agreements to indicate how far they take into account the
principle of solidarity.
(a) The World Trade Organization
The Agreement establishing the WTO 5 1 provides for a polit-
ical organ, the Ministerial Conference, which meets at least
once every two years, and the General Council, which meets "as
appropriate", which means more often than the Ministerial
Conference. The Ministerial Conference will deal with politi-
cally difficult decisions, and the General Council will tackle
technical questions.
49 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993) reprinted in 33 I.L.M.
1140; Peter-Tobias Stoll, Die WTO: Neue Welthandelsorganisation, neue
Welthandelsordnung, Ergebnisse der Uruguay-Runde des GATT, 54 ZAORV 241
(1994). For an economic analysis of the negotiation, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
Why do governments need the Uruguay Round Agreements, NAFTA and the EEA?,
49 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 31 (1994).
50 GATT WTO News, 31 October 1994, issued by the Information and Media
Relations Division of GATT.
51 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, pt. II of Final Act
embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 144 (1994), pt. II.
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A Committee on Trade and Development, a Committee on
Balance-of-Payments Restrictions, and a Committee on Budget,
Finance and Administration will function as Ministerial Confer-
ence subcommittees. The Committee on Trade and Develop-
ment will provide developing countries with a forum in which
they can monitor the effects of the Agreements of the Uruguay
Round on their development and seek implementation meas-
ures and system changes to ensure that their needs are not ne-
glected. The Committee on Trade and Development will
periodically review the special provisions in the Multilateral
Trade Agreements in favor of the least-developed member
states and report to the General Council for appropriate action.
An important feature of the WTO Agreement is the
"reuniversalization" of the GATT rules.52 Professor John Jack-
son of the University of Michigan rightly used the term "Bal-
kanization" to describe the old structure of the GATT system,
under which a group of states was allowed to develop rules
binding inter se without obtaining the consent of all GATT
members to amend the GATT agreement itself.53 While, previ-
ously, a series of separate agreements (for example, the codes
on standards subsidies and anti-dumping) had been concluded
by interested member states outside the GATT ambit, member-
ship in the WTO now requires acceptance of the whole set of
rules. According to Article II of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, the agreements included in Annexes
1, 2 and 3 of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round (basically the
separate agreements or codes on standards, subsidies and anti-
dumping adopted by some GATT members at the Tokyo Round),
are now an integral part of GATT 1994 and therefore binding on
all members.54 The members of the WTO must also accept the
new agreements negotiated in the Uruguay Round, especially
the agreements on trade in services, on trade-related aspects of
52 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform
in the New GAAA, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477, 478 (1994). See also Knut Ipsen & Ulrich
R. Halter, Rule of Law in den Internationalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen: Die
Welthandelsorganisation, 40 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WrRTSCHAFr 717, 719
(1994).
53 John H. Jackson, The Birth of the GATT-MTN System: A Constitutional
Appraisal, 12 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 36, 52 (1980). See also Lowenfeld, supra
note 52, and discussions by panelists, including John H. Jackson, in AM. J. INT'L
L., Proceedings of the 89th Annual Meeting, April 5-8, 1995, pp 316-337.
54 Supra note 51.
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intellectual property rights, on trade-related aspects of invest-
ment measures, and on trade in textiles and clothing.
55
Missing from the Uruguay Round agenda was a fundamen-
tal reform of the GATT in order to enable developing countries
to acquire a more balanced share of the world market. The
driving force behind the negotiations was the developed coun-
tries, particularly the United States, which sought inter alia, to
gain better market access in the service sector and to secure
better protection of intellectual property rights.56 Nevertheless,
the developing countries did achieve some benefits.
(b) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
During the negotiations on the liberalization of services, de-
veloping countries were preoccupied with questions of sover-
eignty. Service industries in these countries are often owned by
governments, which use them as instruments of economic and
social policy. Governments of these states thus have been reluc-
tant to deregulate their service sectors and grant access to for-
eign competitors, even though the latter often can provide more
efficient services and indeed stimulate growth in other sectors
of a national economy.
55 Id. A few former agreements concluded by some Member States under the
ambit of the old GATT system are now called Plurilateral Trade Agreements.
They are binding only on those members who have agreed to them. The agree-
ments include the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, the Agreement on Gov-
ernment Procurement, the International Dairy Arrangement and the
International Bovine Meat Agreement (See Annex 4 of the Final Act).
56 See Terrence G. Berg, Trade in Services: Toward a 'Development Round' of
GATT Negotiations Benefiting Both Developing and Industrialized States, 28
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1987) (for a detailed analysis of the policy goals of the United
States and their negotiating position in the Uruguay Round in relation to serv-
ices). See generally THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND, A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-
1992) (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1994). A brief history of the negotiations is provided
by Stoll, supra note 49, at 241-339. According to Thomas Oppermann and Marc
Beise, the Uruguay Round had a negative impact on trade diplomacy. Thomas
Oppermann & Marc Beise, Die neue Welthandelsorganisation - ein stabiles
Regelwerk fdr weltweiten Freihanddl? 49 EUROPA ARCHIV 195, 199 (1994). The
most important compromises were reached in negotiations between the main oppo-
nents, the United States and the European Union. Id. Japan and Canada were
also important players but the smaller states found themselves in a "take it or
leave it" situation. Id. They foresaw major difficulties in upcoming debates over
the issue of trade and environment. Id.
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The "general obligations" in Part II of the GATS,5 7 binding
on all member states, contain provisions on most-favored-nation
(MFN) treatment and on publication and notification of na-
tional measures or international agreements ("transparency,"
Article III).58 Article VII deals with the recognition of profes-
sional qualifications and requires nondiscriminatory treat-
ment.59 The obligations in Part III go farther but are not
automatically binding. Article XVII requires national treat-
ment of suppliers of services.60 Article IX prohibits the hinder-
ing of payment for services.6 1 These and the other Part III
obligations arise only for member states that agree to them.
Article IV of the GATS pays special attention to the needs
of developing countries.62 It says that the increasing participa-
tion of developing-country member states in world trade is to be
facilitated through negotiated specific commitments by mem-
bers pursuant to Parts III and IV of the Agreement. 68 Part IV
schedules successive rounds of negotiations, beginning not later
than five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement and periodically thereafter, with a view to achieving
progressively higher levels of liberalization.64 The commit-
ments that must be negotiated in the future relate to access to
markets, technology, distribution channels and information
networks.65 The agreement on services makes it clear that the
industrialized countries are not willing to negotiate obligatory
technology transfers as stipulated in Part XI of the Law of the
Sea Convention before it was changed. 66 Article IV of the GATS
57 General Agreement on Trade in Services, in Uruguay Final Round Act, De-
cember 15, 1993, Annex 1B, GATT Doc. No. MTN/FA, 33 ILM 1130 (1994).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 See Annex 1B, supra note 57.
6 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See Annex 1B, supra note 57.
66 MAHMOUDI, THE LAW OF DEEP SEA-BED MINING (1987); see also Norbert J.
Prill, Technologietransfer und Meeresnutzung, 38 ZAORV 801 (1978); Renate
Platzoder, Substantive Changes in a Multilateral Treaty Before Its Entry into
Force: The Case of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 4
EuR. J. INT'L L. 390 (1993); Marius B. Berenbrok and Peter Nussbaum, Zum In-
krafttreten des Seerechtsiibereinkommens der Vereinten Nationen, 40 RECHT DER
INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr 910 (1994).
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provides for technology access on a commercial basis aimed at
strengthening the capacity, efficiency and competitiveness of
service sectors in developing countries. 67
Access to information about service markets in developed
countries is to be facilitated in order to improve market access
for service suppliers in developing countries. According to Arti-
cle IV(2) of the GATS, industrialized countries must establish
contact points within two years from the date of entry into force
of the WTO Agreement and make available information about
commercial and technical aspects of the supply of services,
about registration, recognition, professional qualifications, and
the availability of services technology.68
(c) GATT 1994 and Dispute Settlement
The dispute-settlement procedure of Article XXIII of GATT
1947 made it possible for the losing party to block the adoption
of a panel report. Panel reports required the approval of the
GATT Council to become effective; every member state had one
vote in the Council, and the decision required unanimity. At
the same time, when their interests were in jeopardy, the eco-
nomic powers, by exerting economic pressure on states they re-
garded as recalcitrants, were able to enforce GATT rules
outside the ambit of the established dispute-settlement mecha-
nism. In this context, one thinks immediately of the famous (or
infamous) procedure under section 301 of the U. S. Trade Act.69
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes establishes a stricter, more effective
system.70 A major reform is that, unless disapproved by con-
sensus, panel decisions go into effect automatically within sixty
days. Article 23 of the Understanding, "Strengthening of the
Multilateral System," provides that, when member states seek
redress of a violation of the GATT or a related agreement, "they
shall have recourse to, and abide by the rules and procedures of
this understanding"; and they shall not make a determination
67 See Annex 1B, supra note 57.
68 Id.
69 See AGGREssIvE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE
WORLD TRADINo SYSTnEM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh Patrick eds., 1990).
70 For an evaluation of the new dispute-settlement procedure, see Lowenfeld,
supra note 52, at 479; Stoll, supra note 49, at 266; and Bernard May, Der erfol-
greiche GATT-Abschluss - ein Pyrrhussieg., 49 EUROPA-ARCHIV 33, 37 (1994).
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that a violation has occurred or that benefits have been nulli-
fied, "except through recourse to dispute settlement in accord-
ance with the... Understanding."
(d) Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
The gradual integration of the clothing and textile sector
into the GATT system has been a matter of importance for de-
veloping countries.71 Their market access was severely re-
stricted by the Multifiber Arrangement, which protected the
interests of the industrialized countries' textile industries.72
Although those countries were able to negotiate a long transi-
tion period of ten years, the new Agreement will gradually
phase out Multifiber Arrangement restrictions.
(e) Agreement on Agriculture
As is well-known, agriculture proved to be the most difficult
aspect of the Uruguay Round. In this trade arena, the dividing
line runs not between North and South but between Europe and
North America. 73 Import quotas will now be transformed into
duties, the duties will be reduced, and exports of subsidized ag-
ricultural products will also be reduced. While these arrange-
ments will considerably benefit developing countries that are
food exporters, they will cause difficulties for the poorest coun-
tries that are food importers. Low-income, food deficit countries
will not be able to go to the market and buy sufficient food, if
prices rise, as is likely. This problem - a real one - was ad-
dressed by the "Decision on measures concerning the possible
negative effects of the reform programme on least-developed
and net food-importing developing countries." These countries
are to be granted differential treatment in agreements relating
to agricultural export credits and international financial insti-
tutions are to take measures to alleviate short-term financial
difficulties of developing countries.
71 For Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, supra note 57, Annex 1A.
72 Damian Chalmers, The Multifibre Arrangement-Ripping The Shirt Off
The Poor Man's Back, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND DEVELOPING STATES,
193 (Hazel Fox ed., 1992).
73 For Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 57, Annex 1A. See also Stoll,
supra note 49, at 283.
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The Decision also deals with humanitarian relief. It was
agreed that the implementation of the results of the Uruguay
Round on trade in agriculture would not adversely affect the
availability of food aid at a level sufficient to assist in meeting
the food needs of developing countries, especially least-devel-
oped and net food-importing developing countries. To this end,
member states agreed to review the level of food aid established
periodically by the Committee on Food Aid under the Food Aid
Convention (1986) and to initiate negotiations to establish a
level of food aid commitments sufficient to meet the needs of
developing countries during the reform program; to adopt
guidelines to ensure that an increasing proportion of basic food-
stuffs is provided to least-developed and net food-importing de-
veloping countries; and to give full consideration to requests for
the provision of technical and financial assistance to those
countries to improve their agricultural productivity and
infrastructure.
These obligations are not formulated in language suffi-
ciently precise to confer concrete rights for aid payments on de-
veloping countries, but at least the problems facing them in this
sector were addressed in very clear terms. In short, the decision
on attenuating the possible negative effects of the reform pro-
gram on net food-importing countries is useful for developing
countries seeking to strengthen their position when they negoti-
ate for specific assistance from international institutions and
from developed states. The text is also important because it rec-
ognizes the obligation of the community of states (members of
the GATT/WTO) to remedy the negative effects of their activi-
ties on the least wealthy members of the community.
(f) Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(TRIMS)
Following on from the discussion of the concept of the New
International Economic Order in the 1970s, developing coun-
tries, relying on their sovereign rights to regulate foreign direct
investment, imposed strict controls and restrictions on foreign
investment-especially on the activities of multinational corpo-
rations.74 Conditions short of expropriation on, for example, lo-
74 See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 15, 1993, GATT Sales No. 1994 - 4 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMS].
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cation, employment, procurement of materials and components,
exports, and local participation in ownership were at first ac-
cepted, albeit reluctantly, by most of the developed countries. 75
In the 1980s, however, European countries and the United
States concluded investment treaties under which they sought
to secure access to Third-World markets and at the same time
limit restrictions on their investments.
The United States was keen to transform the standards of
the older investment treaties into multilateral standards that
abolished or restricted regulations of the host country on, for
example, local content requirements, export performance re-
quirements, trade balancing requirements, and foreign ex-
change restrictions. Predictably, developing countries opposed
the inclusion of these matters in the GATT negotiations. In the
end, the Agreement on TRIMS, which applies to trade in
goods, 76 provided that TRIMS in violation of the principle of na-
tional treatment 77 or the prohibition of quantitative restric-
tions 78 should not be applied. The Annex to the TRIMS
Agreement contains an "illustrative list" of such measures. 79
Developing countries are granted a transition period of five
to seven years, which may be extended.80 Article IV allows de-
veloping countries to deviate temporarily from the obligations
on national treatment and the abolition of quantitative restric-
tions. They have thus been able to defend (at least temporarily)
their sovereign rights to restrict investments. Unfortunately,
however, they have not attempted to obtain a code of restrictive
business practices, which could strengthen their capacity to
protect against the abusive practices of multinational
corporations.
(g) Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIP)
Intellectual property is another field in which the Uruguay
Round altered the earlier claims and practices of the developing
75 Id.
76 See GATT, supra note 36, art. 1.
77 See GATT, supra note 49, art. III.
78 See GATT, supra note 49, art. XI.
79 TRIMS, supra note 74.
80 See GATT, supra note 36, art. 5.3.
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countries. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights8 l binds WTO Members to the material (not
the procedural and institutional) provisions of existing conven-
tions in the field of intellectual property.8 2 Article III imposes
an obligation for national treatment, Article IV for MFN treat-
ment.8 3 Article VII ("Objectives") refers to the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights as a way of promot-
ing technological innovation and refers specifically to the trans-
fer and dissemination of technology.8 4 Article VIII permits
restrictions, if they are necessary to protect public health and
nutrition or to promote the public interest in sectors of vital im-
portance to socioeconomic or technological development.85
Measures needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property
rights or the resort to practices that unreasonably restrain
trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technol-
ogy are also accepted.8 6 Article XL concerns the control of anti-
competitive practices in contractual licenses and requests the
host country of enterprises applying such practices to enter into
consultations with member states affected by such practices.8 7
7. Conclusions
In this brief overview, we see that the (limited) success of
the compromise of the Declaration of International Economic
Cooperation and the failure of the GATT and the new WTO
markedly to incorporate the principle of solidarity illustrate
how the dynamic of the principle should and should not be un-
derstood. Although, in the instruments discussed, the principle
of solidarity was first conceived as an obligation on the part of
developed countries to the LDCs, the past four decades have re-
vealed the essential error of that conception.
81 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994 [hereinafter TRIP], reprinted in The Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations - The Legal Texts 6-19, 365-403 (GATT Secreta-
riat ed., 1994) [hereinafter Results of the Uruguay Round].
82 TRIP, supra note 81, art. 1(1).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 TRIP, supra note 81.
87 Id.
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The "one-sided" obligation of solidarity made it practically
impossible for any developed state willingly to recognize a gen-
eral legal obligation arising from it. Although the political and
economic context of the period following decolonization seemed
to create a sense among the Group of 77 that the North did in-
deed "owe" the South, there has been no indication that any
such debt can or ever will be paid, so long as the relevant obliga-
tion is perceived as belonging solely to the developed coun-
tries.8 The continuing deterioration in terms of trade for the
LDCs indicates that "preferential treatment" alone is not the
solution.
In his remarkable study on the principle of solidarity in in-
ternational economic law, Raimund SchUtz analyzes state prac-
tice in the United States, the United Kingdom, France and
Germany, as well as the practice of international organizations,
such as the International Monetary Fund, the European Com-
munity and the International Commodity Organization.8 9 He
first identifies a number of claims related to the idea of solidar-
ity, such as financial assistance, transfer of technology, prefer-
ential and nonreciprocal treatment and stable export income.
At the end, he is able to provide a few instances in which such
rights are vested in the developing countries-for example, the
right to financial assistance in the bilateral relations between
France and its former colonies in black Africa, and the right of
the African-Caribbean-Pacific states in the Lomd Convention to
unhindered EC market access. One of the central conclusions of
this important work is that state practice and the practices of
international organizations have recognized "solidarity rights"
only in situations where there are obligations on both sides, in-
cluding, for example, the duty of developing countries to supply
natural resources, to use financial assistance efficiently and to
realize specific development projects. The kind of reciprocity in-
88 The Group of 77 is an intergovernmental caucus of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly created in 1963 to promote the economic interests of the developing
countries.
89 ScHtrz, supra note 2. Schiitz also looks at the practice of the following
institutions: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Interna-
tional Development Association, International Fund of Agricultural Development,
regional development banks, United Nations Development Programme, Food and
Agriculture Organization, United Nations Industrial Development Organization,
GATT, Common Fund for Commodities.
[Vol. 8:259280
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss2/1
SOLIDARITY
volved here does not always imply "equal" obligations; rather,
the relationship is understood in a broader sense of displaying a
balance of long-term interests between developed countries, who
give assistance, and developing countries, who receive it.
At this point, we can recall Vattel's statement that solidar-
ity involves the idea of states offering "mutual assistance in or-
der to improve their general situation and relations."90 The key
word is "mutual." While it is apparent that wealthier states
will be in a better position to offer assistance to poorer states,
this should not lead to the conclusion that poorer states have no
corresponding obligations to the international community or to
their own nationals. The interdependence of states precludes
this conclusion. It follows that the principle of solidarity cannot
create a global welfare state, for "welfare" also denotes a lop-
sided obligation in the preferential treatment of the "have-nots"
by the "haves." The cooperative compromise of the Declaration
of International Economic Cooperation indicates that solidarity
should create a context in which states acknowledge that they
have obligations to the peace, prosperity, and cultural and envi-
ronmental health of the global community, and that they must
act in accordance with these obligations.
In theory, then, solidarity extends beyond the welfare obli-
gations of strong to weak states. It should be conceived of as the
impetus behind genuine cooperative effort on the part of all
states. Differences in resources and capacities mean that there
will be differences as to how states meet their obligations, but
the fact remains that all states share these obligations. Solidar-
ity, in short, goes beyond "leveling the playing field"; it applies
itself to the rules of the game. Recalling the words of Singapore
at the 1990 General Assembly special session, solidarity
changes the rules from the zero-sum game-"In order to win,
someone else must lose"-to "No one wins unless everyone
wins."
This conception of solidarity may not fit comfortably into
the current context of global economic activity. The WTO
framework, however, with its connected treaties, contains not
only escape clauses and exceptions for developing countries but
also a few embryonic elements of a maturing understanding of
90 Vattel, supra note 2.
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solidarity. The developing countries have for the first time ac-
cepted obligations to reduce tariffs. Furthermore, two key ad-
vantages for them stem not from further exceptional treatment
but from the genuine application of the principles of the GATT.
First, the restrictive regulation of trade in textiles will be
phased out. Secondly, the dispute-settlement procedure has
been improved. Since developing countries are usually not in a
position to use economic pressure to coerce violators of the
GATT rules to fulfil their obligations, the stricter dispute-settle-
ment procedure should be to the advantage of the former.
Nonetheless, there are shortcomings in the Final Act of the
Uruguay Round. Two examples should be sufficient for pur-
poses of illustration. Agriculture and textiles, sectors in which
developing countries should be able to rely on their low labor
costs to competitive advantage, still suffer from the protection-
ism of the developed countries. The Uruguay Round does phase
out the trade restrictions of the Multifiber Agreement, in that
way opening textile markets, but the ten-year transition period
is too long. In the agricultural sector, the negotiations were
driven mainly by the conflicting interests of the United States
and the European Community; the interests of the developing
countries were not really an issue.
It is thus apparent that there is a long way to go before we
can say that the international economic system has incorpo-
rated the principle of solidarity in any comprehensive sense. In
the sphere of international environmental law, however, the
principle has been more widely accepted, and we now turn our
attention to that area.
IV. SOLmARrrY IN INTERNATioNAL ENVmoNMzNTAL LAW
1. The Stockholm Declaration
The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environ-
ment 9' said that there is a need "for a common outlook and for
common principles to inspire and guide the peoples of the
world."92 Indeed, the success of the Stockholm Conference was
ascribed, in the language of the late Wolfgang Friedmann, to
91 UN Doc. A/Conf. 48/14 (1972) reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416.
92 Id. See further, Louis B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment, 14 HARv. INT'L L.J. 423 (1973).
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the growing realization that the "public international law of co-
existence" was rapidly being replaced by the "public interna-
tional law of cooperation." Principles 21 and 22 of the
Stockholm Declaration echoed the Trail Smelter decision:
states must ensure that activities within their jurisdiction "do
not cause damage to the environment of other states."93 Princi-
ple 22 said that states must cooperate in developing laws on the
liability of polluting countries.94 The Organisation For Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles Con-
cerning Transfrontier Pollution, which came into existence as a
direct result of the Stockholm conference, states in its preamble
that "the common interests of countries concerned by trans-
frontier pollution should induce them to cooperate more closely
in a spirit of international solidarity and to initiate concerted
action for preventing and controlling transfrontier pollution."95
Several scholars have suggested that the principles in the
Stockholm and OECD documents are indicative of custom in in-
ternational law.
The Stockholm Declaration recognized the interrelation-
ship of economic and environmental development and spelled
out ways in which assistance should be given to developing
countries. For instance, Principle 9 states that "Environmental
deficiencies generated by the conditions of under-development
and natural disasters [pose] grave problems and [can] best be
remedied by substantial quantities of financial and technologi-
cal assistance as a supplement to the domestic effort of the de-
veloping countries and such timely assistance as might be
required."96 The United Nations Environmental Programme
(UNEP), established by the General Assembly in 1972, was an-
93 United States v. Canada, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1931-1941). On these questions
see Sir Robert Jennings, The Role of I.C.J. in the Development of International
Environmental Law, address delivered at the Earth Summit in Rio, 1992; see also
HARALD HoHmAN, PRAvENTrv RECHTSPFLICHTEN UND - PRINZIPIEN DES MODERNEN
UMWELVOLKERR CHTS (1992); Ulrich Beyerlin, Grenzuberschreitender Umwelt-
schutz und allgemeines Volkeerrecht, in 98 FESTSCHRIFr FUR KARL DOEHRNG 37
(Beitrige Zum AuslAndischen 6ffenlichen Recht und V61kerrecht, 1989); Bruno-
Otto Bryde, Umweltschutz durch allgemeines V6lkerrecht?, 31 ARcmv FOR VOLKER-
REcHT 1 (1993); for an overview see Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Internationales
?iffentliches Umweltrecht, in Vo KERRECHT 805 (Knut Ipsen ed., 3d ed. 1990).
94 Supra note 91.
95 14 ILM 242 (1975).
96 Supra note 91.
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other positive result of the Stockholm Conference. As an organ
of the General Assembly, UNEP coordinates international envi-
ronmental activities and prepares draft conventions. Its Draft
Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the
Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utili-
zation of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States ex-
tends the Stockholm declaration but has not yet been formally
adopted by the General Assembly.97
2. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer
In the twenty years since the adoption of the Stockholm
Declaration, we have seen the coming into force of a number of
conventions; they show that cooperation in dealing with envi-
ronmental problems goes beyond concern for neighboring states
and has become a legal duty. I will focus for a moment on the
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
(1985),98 because the 1990 amendment of its Montreal Protocol
marks a crucial turning point in the development of interna-
tional environmental law. As Patrick Sz6ll said:
When the history of international environmental law comes to be
written, 19 June 1990 will stand out as a critical date. On that
day a large number of the world's States agreed, for the first time,
on a financial regime to tackle, in a really meaningful way, the
interrelationship between environment and development. Earlier
international environmental instruments contained numerous
references to 'taking into account in particular the needs of the
developing countries'. . . to manage their environments, but did
little, if anything, to meet those needs or expand those
capabilities. 99
97 See text of the UNEP Draft in 17 ILM 1091 (1978); see also comments by
Dietrich Rauschning Allgemeine Volkerrechtsregeln zum Schutz gegen grenz-
iiberschreitende Umweltbeeintreichtigungen, in STAATSRECHT-VOLKERRECHT-
EUROPARECHT, FEsTscmurr FOR SCHLOCHAUER, 557, 569 (Ingo von Munch ed.,
1981).
98 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signa-
ture Mar. 22, 1985, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.53/Rev. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 11,097, 26 ILM
1529 (1987) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
99 Patrick Sz6ll, Ozone Layer and Climate Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 167 (Winfried Lang et al. eds., 1991); on the rela-
tionship between environmental protection and development see also
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The Vienna Convention sets forth a number of general obliga-
tions and some specific provisions on monitoring, interstate co-
operation, exchange of information, and so on.100 Because it
obliges the parties to cooperate in various ways, it has produced
practical results in terms of environmental protection of the
ozone layer, as scientific evidence regarding the damaging ef-
fects of ozone-depleting substances and public concern have in-
creased, and as technological progress has enabled industry to
find satisfactory substitutional substances. 101
The Montreal Protoco 10 2 to this convention provides for a
staged reduction of both the consumption and production of the
five most depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and a freeze on
the production and consumption levels of three other com-
pounds.10 3 It also limits trade in depleting substances with
nonparties and takes account of the special situation of develop-
ing countries. 0 4 Apart from granting generous time tables for
the reduction of relevant substances to the developing coun-
tries, the protocol calls on the parties to make available envi-
ronmentally safe substitutes and related technology and to
support their use through the granting of subsidies, aids, cred-
its, guarantees and insurance programs.105
Important for our present purposes, the protocol estab-
lished a multilateral fund to enable developing countries to
comply with their environmental obligations. 10 6 Proposals to
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (R. D. Munro & J. G.
Lammers eds., 1987).
100 Supra note 98.
101 Supra note 98.
102 The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer,
opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987, 26 ILM 1550 (1987) [hereinafter Montreal
Protocol].
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. The Montreal Protocol contains an interesting procedure for expanding
the obligations of this regime. While "amendments" to the Vienna Convention and
its protocols must be ratified (Articles 9, 10, 13 Vienna Convention), the "adjust-
ments" (Articles 2.9, 2.10) can be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the parties
present. See Peter M. Lawrence, International Legal Regulation for Protection of
the Ozone Layer: Some Problems of Implementation, 2 J. ENVTL L. 17, 34 (1990).
106 The fund's capital ($160 million over three years from 1991-93) was in-
creased by $40 million to $200 million for the same period after China joined the
Montreal Protocol. The fund is administered by an Executive Committee that con-
sists of seven representatives of developing countries and seven from other coun-
tries. Montreal is the venue of the secretariat of the fund. See Peter Lawrence,
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establish the fund were initially opposed by the United States,
which was anxious to avoid a precedent; but agreement was
eventually reached on a fund that would also serve as an incen-
tive to developing countries to become parties to the protocol.
This fund is financed by contributions levied on developed coun-
tries in accordance with the UN scale of assessment. The over-
all policy of the fund is determined at annual meetings of the
parties acting in cooperation with the World Bank, the UNEP
and the UNDP.
The fund is designed to cover the "incremental" costs of de-
veloping countries in meeting their obligations under the Mon-
treal Protocol-for example, the cost of converting existing
production facilities in order to produce substitutes for ozone-
depleting substances. The protocol also provides for the sharing
of information.
3. The Mediterranean Action Plan
Most attempts to regulate the international environmental
order with hard-law instruments, such as those I have referred
to, have met resistance similar to that experienced by attempts
to regulate the international economic order. Part, but cer-
tainly not all, of the difficulty is that environmentally hazard-
ous behavior is often linked with economic interests. Deeply
entrenched in the discourse is the idea that environmental pro-
tection will impair economic growth-an effect that both devel-
oped and developing countries see as a cause for concern.
As a result of inequalities in resources, different economic
needs, and the difficulties of attributing legal responsibility, in-
ternational environmental regulation has not based itself on
strict legal rights and duties. "Soft law" regimes, usually at the
regional level, that set out objects, purposes and interests, have
frequently replaced firm legal obligations. It is generally under-
stood that "soft law" creates and delineates goals to be achieved
in the future rather than strict directives for instant action.
Fortunately, the practice of states indicates that these guide-
Technology Transfer Funds and the Law-Recent Amendments to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 4 J. ENVTL. L. 15, 18 (1992);
Peter H. Sand, International Environmental Law After Rio, 4 EUR. J. Irr'L L. 377,
388 (1993) (for remarks on the bipolar structure of this committee and other
organizations).
[Vol. 8:259286
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss2/1
SOLIDARITY
lines are taken seriously, even in the absence of enforcement
mechanisms107
An example of the success of soft-law regimes is the Medi-
terranean Action Plan (Med Plan) which, driven by information
supplied by an "epistemic community" of scientists, began in the
early 1970s under the auspices of the UINEP. The Med Plan
began as a loose and informal effort to coordinate the policies of
states bordering on the Mediterranean and grew, over the next
decade, into a more traditional legal arrangement with stan-
dards and enforcement mechanisms at regional and local levels.
The Plan demonstrates that, at least with regards to environ-
mental problems, soft-law can help to define standards of good
behavior without the need for those standards to be consecrated
as norms of customary law. Soft-law creates the "pull" of legiti-
macy even without sanctions. The coherence it confers on
states' behavior enables, and possibly expedites, the lawmaking
process. It is significant that soft-law creates this pull of legiti-
macy through the articulation of common goals. Soft-law is it-
self a reflection of solidarity.
4. The UN Conference on Environment and Development
Twenty years after the Stockholm Conference of 1972, the
UNCED-the largest UN conference ever organized, with more
than 30,000 participants from 176 countries-took place in Rio
de Janeiro.108 Although the link between development and en-
vironmental protection was recognized by the Stockholm Decla-
ration, the fact is that developmental concerns received rather
peripheral attention in that important document. The Rio Con-
ference, in contrast, placed development at the very center of its
concerns. Principle 4 of its Declaration states, "In order to
achieve sustainable development, environmental protection
107 See Peter M. Haas, Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Medi-
terranean Pollution Control, 43 IN'L OG. 377 (1989); Aldo Chircop, Cooperative
Regimes in Ocean Management: A Study in Mediterranean Regionalism (1988)
(unpublished doctoral thesis, Dalhousie Law School (Canada)); and Pierre-Marie
Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 420 (1990).
108 See Sand, supra note 106.
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shall constitute an integral part of the development process and
cannot be considered in isolation from it."109
The Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature
at Rio, covers carbon dioxide and all other greenhouse gases
and establishes a process by which emissions of those gases can
be monitored and controlled.110 It does not lay down a specific
timetable for a freeze on or reduction of emissions, but it pro-
vides a framework within which to proceed and sets conferences
on a regular basis to "examine the obligations of the parties and
the institutional arrangements under the convention."1 The
first conference, in Berlin in 1995, did not succeed in setting a
fixed date and a fixed reduction target for carbon dioxide emis-
sions; it agreed instead to negotiate a protocol in 1997.
Article 11 of the Convention on Climate Change establishes
a mechanism to provide financial resources on a grant or con-
cessional basis, for assistance with, inter alia, the transfer of
technology.11 2 Article 4 lists the kinds of assistance, including
financial transfers, that are expected from the developed coun-
tries. 1 3 They are to assist developing countries that are espe-
cially vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change-for
example, small island-states and states with low-lying coastal
areas-in meeting the costs of adapting to those adverse effects.
114 They are to facilitate and finance the transfer of or access to
environmentally sound technologies and know-how to develop-
ing countries to enable them to implement the provisions of the
convention. The treaty does not contain provisions on the ad-
ministration of the fund or the contributions of the developed
countries, but the interim arrangement in Article 21 provides
that financial assistance under the convention is to be chan-
neled through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF)115 of
109 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1 (1992),
reprinted in 31 ILM 874.
110 Framework Convention on Climate Change, United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 237/18, May 9, 1992, reprinted in
31 ILM 849 (1992).
I Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Supra note 110.
115 The GEF was launched in November 1990 as an experimental three-year
program. The fund, in excess of $1.000 million, is managed by the World Bank and
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the World Bank, the UNDP, and the UNEP.116 The Convention
on Biological Diversity' 17 also contains provisions on technology
transfer (Article 16) and financial funding (Article 29).
It is not surprising that the industrialized countries are
somewhat reluctant to contribute to the climate change and bio-
diversity funds. While the funds established by the Montreal
Protocol are ear-marked for specific problems, especially those
in the context of the substitution of the CFCs, the funds estab-
lished by the Rio Conference are directed at problems of a much
larger scale. Nevertheless, the point of these and other exam-
ples is that at the Rio Conference the international community
recognized that environmental protection of the globe and the
development of all states is a common aim now formulated in
the principle of sustainable development.
It is apparent, then, that technology transfer and contribu-
tions to the funds are not to be thought of as donations; the in-
dustrialized states by such measures fulfill their obligations
under the principle of solidarity. Developing states have a cor-
responding obligation under the same principle to cooperate
and participate in the common efforts to protect the environ-
ment. It can be expected that developed countries will be more
willing to provide funds when developing countries comply with
the terms of the conventions and when the funds are seen to
have been used effectively.
5. Conclusions
Thus far, I have noted similarities between environmental
and economic regulation. These similarities arise from the fact
that economic and environmental issues are interconnected;
both present challenges to enforcement of rights and duties at
the international level, and both reveal the essential interde-
pendence of states.
is designed to help developing countries relieve pressure on global ecosystems. See
Peter Slinn, Development Issues: The International Law of Development and
Global Climate Change, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 75,
92 (Robert Churchill & David Freestone eds., 1991).
116 See Sand, supra note 106, at 387; Urich Bayerlin, Rio-Konferenz 1992:
Beginn einer neuen globalen Umweltrechtsordnung?, 54 ZAORV 124, 136 (1994).
117 The Convention on Biological Diversity, U.N. Misc. Doc. [ST/IDPI/1307-Oct.
1992, June 5, 1992, 31 ILM 1818 (1992).
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It is consistent with the interconnectedness of these two
matters that the growing consensus about environmental issues
should be mapped onto economic issues. More developed, per-
haps, in the economic than in the environmental sphere is the
sense that the obligations of solidarity devolve on all states. In
the domain of environmental law, however, the concept of mu-
tually beneficial common goals is more clearly articulated. If
the two developments-still apparently distinct-are com-
bined, a picture resembling the previously described theoretical
conception of solidarity begins to emerge.
Solidarity is neither charity nor welfare; it is an under-
standing among formal equals that they will refrain from ac-
tions that would significantly interfere with the realization and
maintenance of common goals or interests. Solidarity requires
an understanding and acceptance by every member of the com-
munity that it consciously conceives of its own interests as be-
ing inextricable from the interests of the whole. No state may
choose to exercise its power in a way that gravely threatens the
integrity of the community. This principle would have an obvi-
ous impact on economic law; larger, more powerful capital-ex-
porting states could not, by placing their own interests first,
significantly interfere with the interests of smaller, weaker
countries. Similarly, in the environmental domain, no state,
whether developed or developing, could significantly interfere
with the general interest of the community by asserting that its
narrower national interests came first.
V. SOLIDARITY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND IN THE LEGAL ORDER OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Several solidarity-related concepts are already well estab-
lished in various parts national and international judicial sys-
tems; even a brief reference to these examples will help us
acquire a sense of the future development of the principle of sol-
idarity at the broader international level.
[Vol. 8:259290
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss2/1
19961 SOLIDARITY
1. Bundestreue in German Constitutional Law
The principle of "Bundestreue" has a long history in Ger-
man constitutional law.118 This principle translates into Eng-
lish as "fidelity to the federation."119 This duty of loyalty to the
federation and to the idea of cooperation between the federal
government and the Lander influences the strict interpretation
and application of the letter of the Basic Law.
The German Constitutional Court first elaborated the prin-
ciple of Bundestreue in the 1950s and used it most aggressively
in the 1960s. 120 It was first mentioned in 1952 in a case where
the Constitutional Court held that a legislative provision re-
quiring the Lander to agree to the allocation of federal funds
demanded unanimous consent of all Lander.' 2' The Court em-
phasized, however, that a duty of fidelity obligated the Lander
to cooperate and work together in good faith to reach a common
understanding with the federal government. Other cases in-
volved salaries of Lander employees, 22 restriction of confes-
sional education by the Lander and obligations of international
118 See generally H. BAUER, DIE BUNDESTREUE: ZUGLEICH EIN BEITRAG ZUR
DOGMATIK DES BUNDESSTAATSRECHTS UND ZUR RECHTSVERHALTNISLEHRE, (1992)
(description and analysis of historical and philosophical underpinnings of the con-
cept of Bundestreue). Although this section explores the principle of Bundestreue
only in the context of German law, it exists as well under Swiss law. See Ungiiltige
Wiedervereinigungsinitiative des Juras, Neue Zircher Zeitung, No. 139 (June 18,
1992).
119 Philip Blair, Federalism, Legalism and Political Reality: The Record of the
Federal Constitutional Court, in GERMAN FEDERALISM TODAY 63 (Charlie Jeffery &
Peter Savigear eds., 1991) [hereinafter Blair, Federalism, Legalism and Political
Reality]; P. BLAIR, FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN WESr GERMANY 162 (1981)
[hereinafter BLAIR, FEDERALISM AND JuDIcIAL REVIEW]. Bundestreue is defined as
"die wechselseitige Verpffichtung zwischen dem Gesamtstaat und den Glied-
staaten (in der Bundesrepublik also zwischen Bund und Lindern) zu vertrauen-
svoller Zusammenarbeit und zur Einhaltung der verfassungsmissigen
Kompetenzverteilung." See CREIFELDS' LAW DICTIONARY 238 (9th ed. 1988).
120 For an overview of German case law, see Blair, Federalism, Legalism and
Political Reality and BLAIR, FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW.
121 2 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 299, 315
(1952).
122 4 BVerfGE 115, 140 (1954). In this case the court invalidated the federal
framework regulations regarding civil servants' salaries, leaving the Lander free
to develop their own salary structures. Here the court also used the principle of
Bundestreue to limit the Landers' autonomy in determining fiscal policy by requir-
ing the governments to take into consideration the interests of the federal govern-
ment and the overall financial structure of the federation.
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treaties, 123 and the establishment of a second television channel
by the federal government. 124 The court also applied the doc-
trine of Bundestreue to protect the power of the federal govern-
ment-for example, in the case of a referendum on nuclear
armament organized by a local authority. 125
In addition to Bundestreue, which, though now less promi-
nent than it was in the 1960s, remains a relevant principle in
the context of German federalism, it is important to bear in
mind that German constitutional law incorporates the obliga-
tions of mutual cooperation, loyalty and assistance also (and in
more precise terms) in the financial chapter of the Basic Law (X.
Das Finanzwesen Articles 104(a) to 115 GG). The structure of
the financial system of federalism in the Basic Law "seeks to
reconcile the budgetary and fiscal autonomy of the Lander and
local authorities with sound finance and an equal level of re-
123 6 BVerfGE 309, 361 (1957). In this case the court upheld Linder actions
severely restricting confessional education, which was guaranteed under the 1933
Concordat Treaty with the Vatican, on the ground that education is under the ex-
clusive control of the Lander. Addressing the federal government's resulting lack
of power to enforce international treaties involving matters under the control of
the Lnder, the court emphasized the principle of Bundestreue and the obligation
of the federal government and the Lander to work toward a mutually acceptable
agreement. Later that year, the Lindau Agreement was reached, requiring the
federal government to obtain the approval of the Lander before accepting interna-
tional obligations in areas of Lander power.
124 12 BVerfGE 205, 254 (1961). In the controversial Television Case, the court
used the principle of Bundestreue to support what many argued were highly polit-
ical dicta regarding the behavior of the federal government. In that case, the court
prohibited the federal government from establishing a second television channel
and rebuked the government for its tactics in attempting to establish the channel.
The court objected to the government's tactic of seeking the approval only of ame-
nable Lander and delaying a response to counterproposals of other Lander and to
the appointment of temporary trustee for the reluctant Lander. These heavy-
handed techniques violated the duty of Bundestreue.
125 8 BVerfGE 122, 138 (1958). In this case a local government arranged to
hold an advisory referendum on the issue of supplying the German army with
atomic weapons in violation of an earlier federal judicial opinion prohibiting such
referenda. The court held that a Land violated the principle of Bundestreue in
failing to ensure the local government's respect for Basic Law. Id. at 138.
Bundestreue arguments were rejected in a variety of contexts. (See, e.g., 14
BVerfGE 197, 215 (1962) (federal inspection of Lander Banks); 21 BVerfGE 312,
326 (1967) (federal taxation of licenses pursuant to Land law); 31 BVerfGE 314,
354 (1971) (federal taxation of broadcasting organizations); 32 BVerfGE 199, 218
(1971) (Land regulation of salary grouping of judges); 34 BVerfGE 9, 44 (1972)
(Land regulation of general salary framework); 43 BVerfGE 291, 348 (1977) (quo-
tas of students per Land admitted to selective university programs).
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sources and social provision throughout Germany."126 While
the complex problems of the division of taxes and tax revenues
between the Federation and the Lander cannot be explored in
this discussion, a few words on the subject may throw light on
our search for solidarity.127
To understand the redistributive elements in the federal
structure of Germany, it is sufficient to note that the principal
taxes in revenue terms, income tax, corporation tax and value-
added tax are shared between the Lander and the Federation.
Once the revenue is divided between the Federation and the
Lander according to fixed quotas and among the different
Lander according to the origin of the tax, a transfer system re-
distributes up to 25 percent of the Landers' VAT share
(Finanzausgleich Article 107,114,GG). The wealthier Lander
must transfer part of their VAT share to the poorer Lander (hor-
izontal transfers). 128
For some Lander, the transfers paid or received are very
substantial. 129 Between 1988 and 1992 Baden-Wiirtemberg
and Hessen were carrying the main burden of transfers. In
1988 Baden-Wilrtemberg contributed DM 1 billion and Hessen
contributed some DM 1.4 billion to the transfer mechanism. In
1992 it was Hessen that had to transfer the largest amount (al-
most DM 2 billion); for Baden-Wiirtemberg it was almost DM
2.6 billion. Between 1989 and 1991, Bavaria, Hamburg and
North Rhine-Westphalia also paid in, but on a much smaller
scale, ranging from DM 5 million to DM 98 million. In the pe-
riod between 1988 and 1992, Rhineland-Palatinate, Nieder-
sachsen, Schleswig-Holstein, Saarland and Bremen were at the
receiving end. The payments ranged from DM 28 million to
126 WILLIAM E. PATERSON & DAVID SouTHERN, GOVERNING GERMANY 154
(1991).
127 See id. (for a brief outline); see also J6n Ipsen 2 Staatsrecht, Staatsor-
ganisationsrecht, ch. 13 (1994); Ingo von Minch, 1 Staatsrecht 221 (1993).
12s The calculations involved are rather complicated. Details are fixed in
"Finanzausgleichsgesets" [Equalization Law], which has been changed recently (by
the law on the federal consolidation program 1993 BGB1 I S.944) and has become
even more complex. Simplifying the process, one could say that the average tax
revenue per capita from income tax, corporation tax and VAT is calculated for the
Lander. The Lander below average receive transfers from the Lander above aver-
age in order to bring their tax revenue up to 95 percent.
129 For all the figures, see the table in J6rn Ipsen, 1 Staatsrecht,
Staatsorganisationsrecht.
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nearly DM 2 billion. Niedersachen received the largest sums,
between DM 1.5 and 2 billion; Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-
Holstein, Saarland and Bremen were paid between DM 300 mil-
lion and DM 600 million.
The new Lander were not included in the system of equali-
zation payments in the first years after German unification; in-
stead, they received payments from separate funds established
by the Federation and the Lander-for example, the German
Unity Fund (Fond Deutsche Einheit). The amounts needed to
finance the transfers were estimated at DM 500 billion for the
Federation alone. In the context of the present discussion,
these payments can be seen as an act of solidarity in a very spe-
cial historical situation. As from 1995, the new Lander were
included in the transfer system, which substantially increased
the amounts paid through this channel.
Apart from the equalization of funds on the level of the
Lander (horizontal transfers), there are also vertical transfers.
The Federation makes grants to the financially weaker Lander
in order to bring their resources up to a level of at least 99.5
percent of the average. 130 The sum of the federal payments
reached almost the level of the payments of the Lander; be-
tween 1988 and 1992 the transfers of the Federation ranged
from DM 2.5 billion to almost DM 4 billion per year. After the
new Lander were integrated into the financial mechanism, the
transfers expected for 1995 were much higher. 13 '
The financial provisions of the German constitution have
been described as the core of the German federal system.132 In-
deed, the Federal Constitutional Court describes the financial
provisions as the cornerstone of the system.'3 3 For present pur-
poses, it is relevant to emphasize that in several judgments the
court has interpreted the provisions and explained their
purpose and limits with reference to the principle of
130 Bundeserganzungszuweisungen, Article 107 II 3 Basic Law.
131 See ULRICH HADE, DIE BUNDESSTAATLICHE FiNANzvERFAssUNG DES
GRUNDGESETZES 1-13, 33-43 at 39 (1994); see also W. Patzing, Zwischen Solidtat
und Solidaritat - die bundesdeutsche Finanzverfassung in der ubergangszeitae
578 (1992).
132 Rudolf Wendt, Finanzhoheit und Finanzausgleich, in 4 HANDBUCH DES
STAATSREcHTs, FINANZVERFASSUNG - BUNDESSTAATLICHE ORDNUNG, 1021, 1022 (Is-
ensee-Kirchhof ed., 1990).
133 E.g., 55 BVerfGE 274, 300; 72 BVerfGE 330, 338.
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Bundestreue.13 4  In summary, then, the principle of
Bundestreue has been elaborated in the judgments of the court
and enshrined in the financial provisions of the Basic Law that
provide for massive financial transfers from the richer Lander
and the Federation to the poorer Ldnder. The legal value of
these provisions has reached such a degree as to allow the trou-
bled Lander, Bremen and Saarland, which suffer from enor-
mous budgetary deficits, to claim additional financial assistance
from the Federation.18 5
2. The Duty of Mutual Cooperation in the Jurisprudence of
the European Court of Justice
The concept of solidarity is also echoed, this time in an in-
ternational context, in the jurisprudence of the European Court
of Justice. Article 5 of the European Economic Community
Treaty says that "Member States shall take all appropriate
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of
the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from ac-
tion taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall fa-
cilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks. They shall
abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attain-
ment of the objectives of this Treaty."136
Article 5 thus imposes two general duties on states party to
the treaty: to honor commitments growing out of the treaty or
institutional actions and to promote the realization of the aims
of the Community. The jurisprudence of the European Court of
'34 E.g., 72 BVerfGE 330, 386; 86 BVerfGE 248 at 214 (where the court uses
the expression: "das biindische Prinzip des Einstehens fbireinander").
135 In 84 BVerfGE 148, the court found Bremen and Saarland to be existen-
tially threatened by their budgetary deficits. The court described the purpose of
the financial provisions: to provide for an adequate distribution of funds that
would enable the Linder and the Federation fulfil their tasks in their own respon-
sibility, i.e., autonomously. The court decided in favor of the Lnder's claim. It
held that the Federation and the Lander are under an obligation to assist the two
troubled Lander. However, it did not prescribe the exact measures to be taken.
The solutions that the court offered ranged from transfer payments to the reorgan-
ization of the territory in order to create viable Lander. The Federation imple-
mented the judgment with the adoption of section 11 VI Finanzausgleichsgesetz
[Equalization Law], which will make extra funds available for Saarland and
Bremen (DM 3.4 billion). See Hide, supra note 131, at 37.
136 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EuRoPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC Treaty],
art. 5.
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Justice (ECJ), especially in recent years, has developed these
general duties.137
The President of the ECJ has distinguished three applica-
tions of Article 5.138 Originally the court used Article 5 to rein-
force the application of other more specific provisions in the
treaty. For example, in Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Borken
and Another v. Moormann,139 which upheld a challenge to Ger-
man reinspection of imported poultry as equivalent to quantita-
tive restrictions, the Court said that "the right of an individual
Community citizen to rely on an unconditional and sufficiently
precise provision of a directive against a Member State which
has failed to implement it or has not correctly implemented it is
based on the combined provisions of the third paragraph of Arti-
cle 189 and Article 5 of the EEC Treaty."140 In this first applica-
tion, Article 5 is used to reinforce Article 189's provision that
directives are binding.
The second application uses Article 5 as an independent ba-
sis of obligations of states party to the treaty.14 1 For example,
in Factortame and Others,'142 a case involving new British re-
quirements for the registration of fishing vessels, the ECJ held
that "it is for the national courts, in application of the principle
of cooperation laid down in Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, to en-
sure the legal protection which persons derive from the direct
effect of provisions of Community law."143 While in the
Factortame case the ECJ required the national court to "invent"
137 John Temple Lang observed that as of 1990, over half of the more than 120
judgments citing Article 5 were handed down after 1984. See John Temple Lang,
Community Constitutional Law: Article EEC Treaty, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 645
(1990) [hereinafter Lang Article 5 EEC Treaty].
138 Ole Due, Article 5 du Trait CEE: Une Disposition de Caractgre F6dral?,
CONFERENCE ROBERT ScHuMAN SUR LE DRoIT COMMUNAUTAIRE (June 17, 1991). In
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, the concept of general princi-
ples of community law is broader than the fundamental objectives of the freedoms
granted by the Treaty and include, inter alia, the principles of proportionality and
equity. For the different functions of Article 5, see also Vlad Constantinesco,
L'article 5 CEE, de la bonne foi e la loyautL communautaire, in Du DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL AU DROIT DE L'INTEGRATION: LIBER AMICORUM PIERRE PESCATORE, 97, 114,
(Francesco Capotorti et al. eds., 1987).
139 Case 190/87 1988 E.C.R. 4689, 4722 24.
140 Id.
141 For a description of the case law on this application, see Due, supra note
138, at 8.
142 Case C-213/89 1990 E.C.R. 2433, 2473 19.
143 Id.
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injunctions against Acts of the Crown (measures that were un-
known to British law up to that moment) the Francovich case
went even further. 44 Based on Article 5, the court laid down
the principle that member states that violate their treaty obli-
gations must compensate individuals who suffer damage as a
consequence thereof. This application of Article 5 thus seeks to
ensure the full implementation of Community law by creating
positive obligations for member states.
This third application of Article 5 most closely resembles
the concept of solidarity in international law in that it estab-
lishes a duty of mutual cooperation or loyalty in interstate fed-
eralism.145 Under this case law, a state may have failed to
comply with its Article 5 duties if it "adversely affected the in-
terests of another Member State" without good reason. 146 Since
the prosperity of all member states is an aim of the treaty, one
state may not harm another without reason or justification.
Member states may also be obliged to take positive action to
harmonize their legislation and policies to conform with those of
other member states.147
This duty of mutual cooperation also obtains between Com-
munity institutions and member states in a manner analogous
144 Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich, Bonifaci v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R
5351. For an account of the possible consequences of the decision see Denis F.
Waelbroeck, Treaty violations and liability of Member States and the European
Community: Convergence or Divergence?, in II INSTrrUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF EURo-
PEAN INTEGRATION, ESSAYS IN Honor OF HENRY G. SCHERMERS 467 (Deirdre Curton
& Ton Heukels eds., 1994). Cf Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte and Jorg Ukrow, Haf-
tung des Staates gegenuber dem MarktbUrger ftir gemeinschaftsrechtswidriges
Verhalten, 27 Europarecht 82 (1992) (providing a thorough analysis of the case and
questioning whether the court has overstepped its power to interpret and develop
the law).
145 Due, supra note 138, at 14. Constantinesco, supra note 138, at 114. See
generally Lang, supra note 137, at 677-78 (reciprocal duty of cooperation between
member states and between member states and the Community institutions); John
T. Lang, Article 5 EEC Treaty: The Emergence of Constitutional Principles in the
Case Law of the Court of Justice, 10 FORD. INT'L L. J. 503, 529-30, 536 (duty of
cooperation of Commission and Member States).
146 Case 32/79 Commission v. U.K 1980 E.C.R. 2403, 58, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8692; Case 42/82 Commission v. France, 1983 E.C.R. 1013 36, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8931.
147 Case 235/87, Matteucci, 1988 E.C.R. 5589; Case 272/80, Biologische
Produkten, 1981 E.C.R. 3277; Case 141/78, France v. Royaume-Uni, 1979 E.C.R.
2923.
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to the principle of Bundestreue on the domestic level.148 In fact,
Judge Ole Due, President of the ECJ, recently observed that
"[L]'article 5 a pris, dans la jurisprudence de la Cour, une im-
portance qui d6passe de loin celle du principe 'Pacta sunt ser-
vanda' dans le droit international et qui se rapproche de celle du
principe de droit f~ddral qui, dans le droit constitutionnel alle-
mand, s'appelle la 'Bundestreue".149
But the principle of solidarity is to be found not only in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in relation to
Article 5 of the EC Treaty. As early as 1953, the preamble of
the ECSC Treaty, which was concluded before the EEC Treaty
and the Euratom Treaty, referred to solidarity by recognizing
that Europe could be built "only through practical achievements
which will first of all create real solidarity, and through the es-
tablishment of common bases for economic development."1 50
After the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty,1 51 a reference
to the principle of solidarity was included in the EC Treaty (the
former EEC Treaty): "The Community shall have as its task...
the promotion ... of ... the economic and social cohesion and
solidarity among member States."15 2 As a result of the abolition
148 Case C-2/88 Imm., Zwartveld, 1990 E.C.R. 3365 16-19 and 21-22; Case
94187, Commission v. Germany, 1989 E.C.R. 175; Cases 358/85 and 51/86, France
v. Parliament, 1988 E.C.R. 4821; Case 52/84 Commission v. Belguim, 1986 E.C.R.
389; Case 44/84, Hurd v. Jones, 1986 E.C.R 29, 9 38-39, 44-45, 48-49; Case 230/
81, Luxembourg v. Parliament, 1983 E.C.R. 255, 37. Due, supra note 138, at 14.
149 Due, supra note 138, at 19.
150 The French text refers to "solidaritk de fait", while the German text does
not use the word solidarity but the less colorful term "tatsachliche Verbundenheit."
For details, see Christian Tomuschat, Solidaritit in Europa, in Du DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL AU DROIT DE L'INTPGRATION: LIBER AMERICORUM PIERRE PESCATORE 729,
730 (Francesco Capotorti et al. eds., 1987). However, the term solidarity was used
to describe the relation of the EEC to the overseas countries: "Intending to confirm
the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries and desiring to en-
sure the development of their prosperity, in accordance with the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations." Again the German text used the term
"Verbundenheit." The notion of solidarity appeared in a number of political texts
of the Community prior to the Single European Act. See Epaminondas A. Marias,
Solidarity as an Objective of the European Union and the European Community, in
LEGAL IsuEs OF EuRoPEAN INTEGRATION, 87 (1994). Apart from EEC TREATY art. 5,
art. 44, If 2, art. 108, 1 lb, art. 130a and art. 234 can be understood as reflecting
the principle of solidarity.
151 Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992 Europe/Doc. No.
1795/60, reprinted in 31 ILM 247 (1992) (entered into force Nov. 1, 1993) [hereinaf-
ter Maastricht Treaty].
152 EC TREATY art. 2.
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of unanimity in many fields of community action, observers now
believe that it will not be long before member states initiate
legal proceedings against Community measures that fail to ob-
serve solidarity as a binding objective. Similar predictions ut-
tered in reference to the principle of subsidiarity have met with
skepticism. 153
Whether or not the principle of solidarity will turn out to be
a legal basis on which smaller or poorer member states can in-
validate Community measures that are unfavorable from their
points of view, the obvious fact remains that the principle of sol-
idarity already underlies the financial mechanisms of the
Community.
Of the measures designed to promote economic and social
cohesion and solidarity among member states, the most signifi-
cant are probably the financial contributions of the Community
to specific projects in less favored regions of the Community.154
These so-called structural funds are intended to redress the
principal regional imbalances in the Community through the
development and structural adjustment of regions whose devel-
opment is lagging and the conversion of declining industrial
regions. 155
153 On the conflict between the principle of subsidiarity and the principle of
solidarity, see CHRISTIAN CALLIES, DAS SUBSID1ARITATSPRINZIP NACH ART. 3b DES
VERTRAGES ZUR GRUNDUNG DER EUROPAIISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT, Diss. SAAR-
BROCKEN, 153 (1994).
154 See European Regional Development Fund, Articles 130b, 1130c EEC
Treaty.
155 Another fund that belongs to the structural funds is the European Agricul-
tural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Guidance Section. For details see Thomas
Oppermann, EUROPARECHT, 324-328, 611-616 (1991); HENNIG KLoDr, DIE STRUK-
TURPOLITIK DER EG - ZIELE, AUSWIRKUNGEN, BEZEIHUNGEN ZUR NATIONALEN STRUK-
TURPOLITIK (1992); ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COHESION IN EUROPE, A NEW OBJECTIVE
FOR INTEGRATION, (Achille Hannequart ed., 1992); THE REGIONS AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, THE REGIONAL RESPONSE TO THE SINGLE MARKET IN THE UNDERDEVEL-
OPED AREAS (Robert Leonardi ed., 1993) (outlining the structure of the regions in
Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece and evaluating the Integrated Mediterranean
Programs). See also Harvey Armstrong, Community Regional Policy, in THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE 167 (Juliet Lodge ed., 1989)
(outlining the development of the regional fund); MICHAEL SCHAKLErON, FINANC-
ING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 31-36, 433-48 (1990) (discussing some problems of
the funds); Joanne Scott and Wade Mansell, European Regional Development of
Policy: Confusing Quantity and Quality 18 EUR. L. REV. 87, 87-108 (1993) (apply-
ing the debate on development in international law to the level of European re-
gional policy and criticizing EC regional policy as one-dimensional in that it is
fixed on economic growth only).
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The Community's Social Fund is designed to improve em-
ployment opportunities for workers in the common market; it is
to increase geographical occupational mobility within the Com-
munity and facilitate the adaptation of workers to industrial
changes and to innovations in systems of production. The Cohe-
sion Fund, included in the EC Treaty by the Maastricht Treaty,
is designed to foster the economic and social cohesion of mem-
ber states by assisting the less wealthy states. In the Protocol
on Economic and Social Cohesion annexed to the Maastricht
Treaty, member states agree that the Cohesion Fund will pro-
vide financial contributions of up to 85 percent of public expen-
diture to projects in the field of environment and trans-
European networks in member states with a per capita GNP of
less than 90 percent of the EC average.
The provision of these funds could be seen as side-pay-
ments to the poorer member states in return for their accept-
ance of measures promoting further integration on the level of
the EC. In the absence of a solid basis on which the have-nots
could claim financial assistance, it would have been more diffi-
cult to justify new integrationist policies to them.156 However
that may be, the assistance to the less favored regions fosters
the "common good" of the Community; in the words of the mem-
ber states in the Protocol to the Maastricht Treaty, "The Com-
mission and the Member States ... reaffirm that promotion of
cohesion is vital for success of the Community." 157
We see, then, not only that the European legal order in-
cludes an evolvative interpretation of the duty of mutual coop-
eration,15 8 but also that as the result of the amendments of the
Maastricht Treaty, the EC Treaty explicitly endorses the soli-
darity principle in its Article 2. Equally important for our
search for examples of solidarity are the provisions on the Coin-
156 For a correct evaluation in terms of the negotiation process, see Jo Shaw,
Twin-Track Social Europe-the Inside Track, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT
TREATY, 295, 306 (David O'Keeffe and Patrick M. Twomey eds., 1994). For details
see JIM CLOOS, GASTON REINESCH, DANIEL VIGNES, JOSEPH WEYLAND LE TRAIT9 DE
MAASTRICHT, GENESE, ANALYSE, COMMENTAIRES, 151, 154 (1993). For critical com-
ments on the concept of cohesion see Ingo Hochbaum, KOHASION UND SUB-
SIDIARITAT, 285, 287 (1992) (who views the concept of cohesion as another medium
of the Community to extend its competences (especially in the field of education) at
the expense of the member states).
157 Supra note 151.
158 EC TREATY art. 5.
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munity structural funds. One may say that the elements of a
transfer system already incorporated in the structure of the Eu-
ropean Community reflect the obligations of the principle of sol-
idarity. Moreover, as we have seen, the Article 5 jurisprudence
is a fundamental part of EEC law; it will still apply should the
Maastricht Treaty come into effect. Thus, within the context of
the EEC Treaty and the Maastricht Treaty, the principle of soli-
darity has a fundamental legal impact on the duties of member
states and Community institutions.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
If state sovereignty is regarded as the cornerstone of inter-
national law, the proper architectural metaphor for solidarity,
as an evolving principle, may be "the keystone of international
relations." Solidarity could continue to develop to the point
where it would inform the major choices states make about
their right to achieve their fullest potential while not gravely
interfering with first-order principles of the community of na-
tions. To take this thought one step further: If solidarity is un-
derstood as the common ascription to a common good, it follows
that forestalling self-interested behavior that gravely threatens
the collective good can be characterized as a kind of super-self-
interest. As a member of a community that benefits from the
protection of the community, a state acting in a manner that
preserves the good of the community also preserves its own in-
dividual good.
In some federal states, and in some regions of the world,
the theory and practice of solidarity have already reached im-
pressive levels. I am not suggesting that solidarity has
achieved this stage of development as a principle of universal
international law. Relatively speaking, solidarity will not for
some time reach the level represented by the transfer payments
and constitutional norms in the Federal Republic of Germany,
the EC, and several other federal states. If current practice is
any indication, however, one must conclude that the principle of
solidarity can and does operate within the framework of inter-
national law and that its importance is growing. It represents a
further legal impulse to strengthen those shared obligations
that promote the essential interests of the broader community.
The possibilities inherent in the idea of solidarity should stimu-
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late our thought about the constitutional and structural means
by which a more democratic global society can be realized.1 59
159 For discussions of solidarity at the domestic level, see PHILIP SELZNICK,
THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SocIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY,
357 (1992); NICHOLAS RESCHER, PLURALISM: AGAINST THE DEMAND FOR CONSENSUS
(1993); NORMAN GERAS, SOLIDARITY IN THE CONVERSATION OF HUMANKIND: THE
UNGROUNDABLE LIBERALISM OF RICHARD RORTY (1995). And, on the whole ques-
tion, see the stimulating discussion in SURYA PRAKASH SiNHA, LEGAL POLYCENTIC-
ITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996).
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